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Abstract— In this paper, we analyse the market 
power of the retail industry in the French tomato 
market. Following the methods developed in the 
New Empirical Industrial Organization, we 
develop a structural model of this industry.  
The analysis is based on detailed data on final 
consumption and prices at both shipper and 
consumer levels for two types of tomatoes in 
France. The structural model is composed of a 
system of demand equations, supply equations and 
pricing equations which include terms which 
capture the oligopoly and oligopsony power of the 
retail sector. We show that i) elasticity of demand 
varies during the year ii) the retail sector exercise 
only a ‘moderate’ market power iii) the exercise of 
market power decreases over time iv) If markets 
were competitive, in the case of tomato ‘ronde’ 
retail price would decrease by about 1.2% to 4.5% 
depending on the year; v) In absence of market 
power, shipping price might be 6% to 24% higher 
than observed. We find higher distortions in the 
case of tomato ‘grappe’. We also find that the 
distortions tend to decrease over time. We conclude 
to a moderate exercise of market power of the 
retail sector in the French tomato market. 
Keywords  —  Oligopoly, Oligopsony, Fresh 
products. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The questions of price formation and price 
transmission in food chains are important as a lot of 
analysis of the impact of agricultural policy changes 
generally assume that the prices changes are 
transmitted to the final consumers. It is therefore 
important to develop in depth analysis of how food 
chains are working and how changes in the supply of 
agricultural productions are transmitted to final 
consumers. The current debate about the impact on 
inflation of the significant increase in agricultural 
prices in 2007 is a good example.   
Existing works about how prices are transmitted 
from producers to consumers in fresh fruit and 
vegetable sector in Europe do not provide strong 
support to the thesis of the exercise of a strong market 
power at the retail level. For example, statistical 
analysis of price transmission developed by Hassan 
and Simioni [1] shows that, on the French tomato 
market, margins of the retail sector follow a constant 
pattern. They also showed that in half of the cases, 
price transmission is symmetric. Moreover, when it is 
asymmetric, they showed that positive changes in 
shipping prices are transmitted at a faster rate (to the 
consumers) than negative changes. To sum up, they 
did not find evidence of the exercise of ‘strong’ 
market power.  Recent analysis of productivity gains 
in the French fruits and vegetables industry and how 
these gains are distributed along the chain (Butault, 
[2]) conclude that in the period 1990-2004, 80% of 
upstream productivity gains were kept by producers 
and only 20% were transmitted through price 
decrease. In a perfectly competitive industry, one 
anticipates that upstream productivity gains are fully 
transmitted to the consumers. The fact that upstream 
producers were able to keep a significant part of the 
productivity gains suggests that for any reasons, some 
market power was exercised at the upstream level.  
The above results contradict the conventional 
wisdom that the retail sector, which is much more 
concentrated than the producer sector, exerts 
significant market power in the fruits and vegetables 
industry.  
In this paper, we analyse the market power of the 
retail industry in the French tomato market. More 
precisely, following the methods developed in the 
New Empirical Industrial Organization (see Reiss and 
Wolak, [3]), we develop a structural model of this 
industry. We follow the methodology developed by 
Shroeter and Azzam [4]. Other examples in this   2 
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literature include Bettendorf and Verboven [5] 
analysing price transmission in the European coffee 
market.  
The analysis is based on detailed data on final 
consumption and prices at both shipper and consumer 
levels for two types of tomatoes in France. The 
structural model is composed of a system of demand 
equations, supply equations and pricing equations. 
Pricing equations include terms that represent the 
market power of the retail sector. We show that i) 
elasticity of demand varies during the year ii) the retail 
sector exercise only a ‘moderate’ market power iii) the 
exercise of market power decreases over time iv) If 
markets were competitive, retail price would decrease 
by about 1.2% to 4.5% depending on the year; v) In 
absence of market power, shipping price might be 6% 
to 24% higher than observed. We conclude to a 
moderate exercise of market power of the retail sector 
in this sector. 
II. THE FRENCH TOMATO INDUSTRY  
 
Tomato is the main vegetable consumed in France. 
In 2004, households purchased 841  000 t of fresh 
tomatoes for at home consumption (14 kg/per). In 
2004, the French production of fresh tomatoes 
amounted to 624  000 t while imports were about 
435  000 t (and exports amounted to 95  000t). From 
November to February, the supply mainly comes from 
imports while from March to October it mainly comes 
from the national production (Figure1). 
 




























Figure 1: Monthly supply of tomatoes in France, 2004.  
 
Even if the tomato production is one of the most 
organized among the fruit and vegetable industry, the 
production is not concentrated as the 4 main 
organizations of producers sell 36% of the whole 
production (Giraud, [6]). The four main producers are 
Savéol, Prince de Bretagne, Rougeline and Océane 
which produced about 70, 70, 60 and 25 kt in 2005, 
respectively. The Hirschmann Herfindahl Index of 
concentration at the production level is about 400, 
which is typical of a non concentrated production. 
On the contrary the retail sector is much more 
concentrated. In 2004, the market share of ‘large’ 
retailers was 79%, 14% for open markets, 5% for 
specialized shops and the remaining 2% corresponded 
to direct sales and others. As retail sector is highly 
concentrated in France, CR4 is around 65 to 70% 
while the HHI is certainly about 2000. 
 
There are different varieties of tomatoes. The main 
varieties are tomato ‘ronde’ and tomato ‘grappe’ 
which represent more than 80% of the market in 2005 
(Linéaires, [7]). The remaining are tomato ‘allongée’ 
(about 4% of the market), tomato ‘cerise’ (about 5% 
of the market) and other varieties (about 7% of the 
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Figure 2: Consumption of tomato ‘ronde’ and tomato ‘grappe’ from 2000 
to 2006 (t/week). 
In this paper, we concentrate our analysis on the 
two main varieties that is tomato ‘ronde’ and tomato 
‘grappe’. As shown on Figure 2, the consumption of 
tomato strongly varies during the year with low 
consumption in winter and high consumption in 
summer. Over the period 2000-2006 the tomato 
‘grappe’ has increased its market share, even if during   3 
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winter (that is when imports are large) its market share 
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Figure 3: Relative share of tomato ‘ronde’ and tomato ‘grappe’ from 
2000 to 2006 
 
As illustrated by the example of tomato ‘grappe’ on 
Figure 4, there is a strong correlation between the 
consumer price and the shipper price. The ‘margin’ 
calculated as the difference between the two prices 
(Figure 5) does not exhibit a trend (see in Appendix 1, 
the Figures for tomato ‘ronde’). There are large and 
frequent variations around an average. While prices 
follow a general pattern along the year with lower 
prices in summer, margins do not exhibit such a 
tendency. On the contrary, we find ‘high’ margins and 
‘low’ margins during all the year. The time series of 
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1We tested the stationarity of the margin series using the usual 
KPSS test. 
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Figure 5: Tomato ‘grappe’: Retail Margin from 2000 to 2006 (€/kg) 
 
III. MODEL  
We develop a model for the French fresh tomato 
industry inspired by Appelbaum [8] and Schroeter [9]. 
In particular, we consider a vertical chain with 
relatively small producers offering two varieties of 
tomato which are bought by retailers who then resell 
to final consumers. Therefore our setting is close to 
Schroeter and Azzam [4] or Wann and Sexton [10]). 
Consumer demand is written as follows: 
 
where j and k index product varieties (‘ronde’ and 
‘grappe’), such that the demand for j depends on its 
own price, the price of the other variety, income (yt) 
and other shifters affecting demand (Z1t). t is a time 
index. 
Supply is given by: 
 
where  rjt represents the price perceived by 
producers or shipping price, wt represents the price of 
other inputs, and Z2t other supply shifters. We assume 
that the price of the other variety in a given period t is 
not affecting the supply of j that period. This 
assumption is motivated by the fact that producers   4 
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cannot switch to other variety in the immediate or 
short run. They must wait to the next season to do so. 
The problem of the retailer i is to choose   and   
to maximize: 
 
subject to the demand and supply equations above. 
 is the total output of the industry,   is 
the output of product j by firm i, P(.) is the inverse 
demand function of each product, R(.) is the inverse 
supply function, and C(.) is firm’s i non-material input 
cost depending on quantity and other inputs’ prices. 




where   , is the non-material input marginal 
cost,   (j, k = 1,2) is the elasticity of demand, 
 is the elasticity of material input supply 
and   is the firm’s conjectural variation 
elasticity. It represents the anticipation that firm i 
forms with respect to the reaction of other firms to a 
variation of its own level of production. We allow 
conjectures to be different upstream and dowstream. 
Following Schroeter and Azzam [4], the   can give 
a measure of the non-competitive distortions in a 
market, although one should be careful in making 
inferences about the extent of market power, as 
pointed out by Corts [11]. As noted in Schroeter and 
Azzam [4]   and   should be between 0 and 1, 
such that in a perfectly competitive market there is no 
distortion at all, because no firm expects to be able to 
affect total output when choosing its own quantity, 
while   would correspond to the case of a 
monopoly. The values and signs of the cross 
conjectural parameters,   and   are not restricted in 
general, for example they could be negative if 
products were substitutes. In summary, the first order 
conditions just tell us that for each product the 
marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of the 
material input plus the marginal cost of non-material 
inputs needed to provide the good. Under perfect 
competition the price would equal the price of the raw 
product plus the marginal non-material input cost. 
This analysis has been developed at the firm level. 
However, using aggregate data requires some 
assumptions to guarantee that there is an industry 
counterpart to the first order equations given above. 
Basically, what is needed (see Schroeter and Azzam 
[4]) is constant and equal marginal costs of production 
across firms plus non-jointness of production. This 
means that the production of variety 2 does not affect 
the marginal cost of producing variety 1, and 
viceversa. Fixed costs are allowed to vary across 
firms. More explicitely:   . 
Nevertheless, an aggregate counterpart for the first 
order conditions is not guaranteed to exist and so they 
must be written in terms of industry average values. 
The interpretation of the   is now that they are 
quantity weighted averages of the corresponding 
individual  . Therefore, the industry averaged first 
order conditions can be written as: 
 
 
From these equations we define, as in Schroeter and 
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L measures the degree of distortion on the consumer 
side, M measures the distortion on the producers’ side 
and  D is an aggreage measure of market power. In 
general, we will have higher distortions the smaller the 
elasticities and /or the larger the  . 
Other comparisons of interest can be made with 
respect to the estimated competitive price. Perfect 
competition in retailing implies  . 
Provided we have estimates of supply and demand 
equations, one can impose competition and the solve 
for the market clearing price. This procedure provides 
a comparative static estimate of the competitive price, 
i.e. the price that clears the market if we do not allow 
for any distortion and we keep other things equal. 
With   we can also compute the competitive quantity 
and the distortions between actual and competitive 
prices and quantities. 
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
A. Demand specification  
Following Bettendorf and Verboven [5], we 
consider a linear demand function of the form: 
 
 pjt represents the real price of variety j and pkt the 
price of variety k.  yt is consumers income in real 
terms. As it is unknown we take as proxy the total 
expenditure in fruits and vegetables. TM is the average 
temperature and Mm a dummy for month m such that 
the own-price elasticity of demand is allowed to vary 
through the year. The consumption of tomato shows a 
positive correlation and therefore lagged quantities are 
introduced to control for the autocorrelation of the 
series. That is also the reason to not introduce a 
constant term. The cross-lagged quantity is introduced 
because it is reasonable to think that present 
consumption of tomato will be correlated with total 
past consumption, and not only with consumption of 
one variety. Therefore, covariates will explain the 
variation between previous and current consumption 
and hence elasticities should be understood as short 
run price elasticities. 
B. Supply specification  
The supply of tomato is modelled as a linear 
function: 
 
rjt is the material input price j interacted with a 
monthly dummy. Sun_NOt is a measure of the total 
solar radiation during week t in a representative 
producer area in the northwest of France. Sunlight is 
one of the most important determinants of tomato 
production.  Qjt-52 is introduced as a proxy for 
productive capacity in week t because of this 
dependence of production on seasonal climatological 
conditions and also because the planted area does not 
vary much during the sample period. Therefore, this 
variable would be playing the role of a weekly 
constant term. 
C. Pricing equation specification  
We analyse the cost of the retail activity. The 
technology is rather simple as the product is not 
processed. It is essentially transported, displayed in the 
shop and sold. The elements of cost are thus mainly 
the wholesale price of the product, and other cost 
shifters that in this specification are summarized by 
the price index of transportation costs in real terms. It 
seems reasonable to assume that these inputs are used 
in fixed proportions. Therefore we can write the 
following empirical counterpart of the first order 
conditions, which are estimated in implict form: 
 
 
The variability in supply and demand elasticities 
allows the identification of all behavioral parameters.   6 
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D. Estimation  
We add idiosyncratic error terms and estimate the 
system of six simultaneous equations using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proposed in 
Hansen [12]). 
TM, TrCost, and Sun_NO are treated as exogenous 
variables and used as instruments for all equations in 
the system. Qjt-52  and  Qkt-52  are considered to be 
predetermined and therefore added to the set of 
instruments as well. Considering that there is only 
evidence of an AR(1) in quantities, Qt-52, should no be 
correlated with the error term at time t. The set of 
instruments is completed with other meteorological 
variables: rainfall and temperature in the same 
representative area in the northwest of France, and 
solar radiation, rainfall and temperature in another 
representative producer area of southeast France. 
These instruments are used to control for the 
endogeneity of consumer and material input prices, 
quantities, and income (recall that we use as proxy the 
total expenditure in fruits and vegetables). 
V. DATA  
 
In this paper, we estimate the model on two 
varieties of tomato: tomato ‘ronde’ and tomate 
‘grappe’. We use different data sources. All data refers 
to the period 2000-2006. From the Service des 
Nouvelles des Marchés du Ministère de l’Agriculture 
et de la Pêche (SNM-MAP), we got weekly data on 
prices, both shipping and retail prices for the two 
varieties of tomatoes. From a consumer panel (TNS-
SECODIP), we got weekly data on the quantities 
purchased by consumers (for each of these two 
varieties) as well as the weekly expenditures for fresh 
fruits and vegetables.   
Meteorological data are from INRA and 
Météorologie Nationale and consist in daily 
information about the weather in Ile de France (for the 
demand side) and in North West and South East (for 
the supply side).
2 It is easy to transform these daily 
                                                           
2 We use data from Ile de France as demand shifter because this 
region concentrates a significant part of the French population. 
data in weekly data: the amount of rain during a week 
is obviously the sum of the daily amount of rain over 
the week while the temperature is the average. Finally, 
we got monthly data from the French Statistical 
Institute INSEE. This monthly data correspond to the 
fruit and vegetable price index (used as a deflator), 
and to the transport cost index. The labour cost index 
is quarterly. We transform these monthly (or 
quarterly) data into weekly data assuming linear 
change within the period. We finally have 366 
observations (7*52 + 2). 
 
We provide in the Table 1 some descriptive 
statistics of the series. It should be noted that the 
shipping price is about 50 to 60% of the retail price. 
The retail ‘margins’ (calculated as the difference 
between the retail price and the shipping price) are 
quite similar for the two products and amount to 0.9 to 
0.95 €/kg in average. In average the expenditures for 
tomatoes is about 8% of the total expenditures for 
fruits and vegetables. 
Table 1 : Summary statistics (Weekly data, prices are expressed in €/kg, 
quantities in t, expenditures in k€) 
 
 Average  Std  dev  Min  Max 
Tomato Ronde         
  Shipping price  0.84  0.31  0.27  2.03 
  Retail price  1.74  0.32  1.13  2.96 
  Quantity  3433  1340  1112  7797 
Tomato Grappe         
  Shipping price  1.26  0.43  0.42  2.61 
  Retail price  2.21  0.44  1.18  3.69 
  Quantity  2316  1424  431  6212 
F&V Expenditures  134512  15277  107656  167726 
 
VI. RESULTS  
For both products, we find very significant 
coefficients with the expected signs (see table A1 in 
appendix which reports the value of the parameters as 
well as the t statitictics). With respect to the demand 
side of the model, all estimated elasticities are of the 
right signs and are significantly different from 0. The 
own-price elasticity follows a U-shaped pattern 
through the year. In the short run, the demand is price 
inelastic. However, in winter the elasticity (absolute 
value) is about 0.7 while it reaches a minimum during 
                                                                                                  
With respect to the supply the main areas of production are 
North-West and South East.   7 
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summer (Figure 6).
3 Because, the demand in t depends 
strongly on the demand in t-1, the long run elasticity is 
much higher. Cross-price elasticity is positive and 
significantly different from 0 indicating the 
substitutability between the two varieties of tomatoes. 
It follows a similar pattern. In average, the cross price 
elasticity for tomato ‘ronde’ is 0.5 and it is 0.4 for 
tomato ‘grappe’. We find negative expenditure 
elasticities (not significant in the case of tomato 
‘grappe’). This might be due to substitutions among 
fruit and vegetables when expenditures increase, 
meaning that consumers diversify their purchases. 
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Figure 6: Elasticity of demand for tomato ‘ronde’ (absolute value).  
 
With respect to the supply side, all estimated 
elasticities are of the right signs and are significantly 
different from 0 (one coefficient is negative and not 
significant). The short run own-price elasticity varies 
during the year with especially very low values in 
summer (Figure 7). The elasticity of supply is larger in 
winter when the supply is mainly from imports. The 
supply is dependent on solar irradiation.   
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Figure 7: Elasticity of supply for tomato ‘ronde’ 
 
 
For tomato ‘ronde’ own conjectural coefficients are 
positive and significantly different from 0. It is not the 
case for tomato ‘grappe’ as only cross conjectural 
coefficients are significantly different from 0 (cf. 
Table A1 in annex). To have an estimate of the 
distortion created by the exercise of market power, we 
computed the D,  L and M indexes defined above 
(Table2).  
The exercise of market power is higher in the tomato 
‘grappe’ case than in the tomato ‘ronde’ case. 
According to the results, the distortions created 
upstream and downstream are of same order of 
magnitude.  
 
Table 2: Average Distortion due to the exercise of market power (%).  
  Tomato ‘Ronde’  Tomato ‘Grappe’ 
Upstream 3.8  10.1 
Downstream 3.8  10.2 
Total 11.6  37.6 
 
As elasticities vary within the year, the distortions also 
vary. We provide on the following Figures the 
evolution of these indexes over the whole period. It 
seems that the distortions were higher at the beginning 
of the period than at the end of the period.   
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Figure 10: Downstream distortion due to market power tomato ‘ronde’ 
 
Using supply and demand functions, we then 
computed a counterfactual situation assuming perfect 
competition of the retail sector (both vis à vis the 
upstream sector and the downstream sector). In 2001, 
the competitive retail price would be 4.5% lower than 
the non competitive one for tomato ‘ronde’ (Table 3). 
The shipping price would be 23.3% higher than the 
non competitive. In 2006, the differences between 
competitive price and non competitive price are 
significantly lower.  
   
Table 3: Average difference between observed price and competitive 
prices (in % of observed price).  
  Tomato ‘Ronde’  Tomato ‘Grappe’ 
  2001 2006 2001 2006 
Retail  price  4.5 1.2 9.3 2.2 
Shipping price  -23.3  -5.9  -54.1  -13.2 
We find higher distortions in the case of tomato 
‘grappe’. We also find that distortions were higher in 
2001 than in 2006.  
Restoring perfect competition on the market would not 
increase significantly the consumption of tomatoes 
and consumers’ gains from competition, at least in 
2006, are likely to be small. However, upstream 
producers have to gain from restoring competition as 















Figure 11: Evolution of observed and competitive price of tomato ‘ronde’ 
in 2001. (RPR stands for observed retail price, RPRC for competitive retail 
price (computed), RPR_FE for shipping price, P_Retail_R for computed 
competitive shipping price and D1 is the distortion index).  
   9 
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Figure 12: Evolution of observed and competitive price of tomato ‘ronde’ 
in 2006. (RPR stands for observed retail price, RPRC for competitive retail 
price (computed), RPR_FE for shipping price, P_Retail_R for computed 
competitive shipping price and D1 is the distortion index) 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have estimated the market power 
of the retail sector in the fresh tomato sector in France. 
Using tools from the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization, we have developed a structural model of 
the sector. According to our results, the retail sector 
exert some market power vis à vis the consumers. 
However the exercise of this market power remains 
moderate. For example, in absence of market power, 
we estimate that this would induce a price decrease by 
about 1.2 to 4.5% depending on the year. This would 
lead to marginal increase in the consumption of 
tomatoes. While the retail sector is concentrated, these 
results suggest that, for this product, the competition 
among retailers is effective. A possible explanation 
may be that consumers select their retail shop 
according to the prices of a few number of products, 
among them the tomato. Then price competition 
among retailers is rather ‘tough’ as low price for this 
product is a tool to attract consumers.  
It is mainly producers of tomatoes who suffer from 
the market power of the retail industry. In absence of 
market power, shipping price might be 6 to 24% 
higher than observed for tomato ‘ronde’ and 13 to 
54% for tomato ‘grappe’.  
Finally, according to our results the exercise of 
market power was larger in 2001 than in 2006. Is the 
increase in producer’s concentration responsible for 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Results from the estimation of the system. 
 
  Tomato ‘Ronde’ Tomato ‘Grappe’
Parameters  Value  T stat Value T stat 
Demand    
  January  -886,330 -12,271  -343,059 -11,407 
  February  -870,645 -13,001  -331,853 -10,130 
  March  -846,888 -13,731  -333,205 -9,618 
  April  -805,104 -14,471  -322,951 -8,802 
  May  -628,680 -12,158  -296,250 -7,808 
  June  -686,289 -15,249  -482,868 -10,507 
  July  -892,716 -18,963  -878,609 -20,449 
  August  -991,281 -17,805  -777,584 -18,261 
  September  -1000,043 -17,463  -662,508 -16,496 
  October  -983,144 -16,218  -526,019 -14,706 
  November  -995,236 -15,331  -429,565 -12,934 
  December  -1020,977 -15,238  -383,393 -11,992 
  Cross price effect  793,497 16,650  414,572 8,840 
  Income  -0,002 -2,906  -0,000  -0,734 
  Temperature  17,692 12,285  25,256 15,620 
  Q ‘own’ t‐1  0,922 72,545  0,899 74,557 
  Q ‘cross’ t‐1  0,041 2,629  0,079 7,671 
Supply    
  January  1191,907 22,557  162,092 18,154 
  February  679,158 19,124  39,794 3,650 
  March  472,013 12,425  65,384 6,102 
  April  314,174 9,329  203,395 8,728 
  May  632,171 10,854  564,844 17,310 
  June  1073,138 13,327  1380,432 29,753 
  July  1293,126 17,537  822,360 24,554 
  August  521,431 8,684  -10,015  -1,047 
  September  469,694 10,660  57,154 3,507 
  October  802,165 20,679  192,636 13,102 
  November  918,498 29,598  358,479 32,875 
  December  819,662 26,805  198,960 16,980 
  Qt‐52  0,616 91,415  0,515 52,827 
  Sun  0,073 27,342  0,099 42,503 
Conjectural variations    
 Demand side       
  Theta ‘own’  0,063 9,602  0,002  1,357 
  Theta ‘cross’  0,011 5,945  0,084 9,089 
 Supply side       
  Theta ‘own’  0,005 4,974  0,000  1,178 
  Theta ‘cross’  0,000  1,210 0,012 6,185 
 
 
 